In January 1991, less than two weeks before the commencement of hostilities to drive Iraq from occupied Kuwait, the French poststructuralist philosopher Jean Baudrillard published an article in Libération entitled, "The Gulf War Will Not Take Place". He argued that this war would never happen in a meaningful sense of the word, because technology had transformed perceptions of conflict to the point where all that was left was the simulacrum of war. As the bombs were falling and troops were moving, he produced a follow-up piece: "The Gulf War Is Not Taking Place". After Iraq had been driven from Kuwait and tens of thousands had died, he returned to the opinion pages with "The Gulf War Did Not Take Place". The three essays are now conveniently published together in a volume by Polity Press entitled The Gulf War Never Happened.
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Is it not a similar conceit to question the existence of ASEAN? Without doubt, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) represents an important slice of the world. It encompasses a population of around half a billion, with a combined GDP in the order of a trillion U.S. dollars. From the five countries that signed the Bangkok Declaration in 1967, 2 it has added Brunei in 1984, and Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia between 1995 and 1999.
But the key questions I would like to raise in this article are, first, what exactly is ASEAN in international legal terms? Secondly, I hope to consider whether in political terms ASEAN is greater than the sum of its parts: in other words, whether ASEAN as an entity offers (2008) something more than the ten separate nation-states that constitute it. We can think of these questions as, first, does ASEAN exist? And, secondly, does ASEAN matter?
I. DOES ASEAN EXIST?
What is ASEAN? In particular, what is its legal status? Clearly it is more than just a "group of friends", ten states that share some limited set of interests and goals; 3 but clearly it is also less than the United Nations (UN), an international organization that asserts the power to impose binding obligations on all states. 4 It is more than an annual meeting of foreign ministers hoping to promote economic growth, but less than the World Trade Organization. Of the world's significant regional organizations, the powers ceded by members to the centre are less than within the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), or the Organization of American States (OAS). Yet within Asia, it is perhaps the most important regional organization, with a wider mandate than the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) and deeper commitments than the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
Speaking in 1998, in the wake of an economic crisis that shocked the region's "tigers" and "dragons", the Secretary-General of ASEAN, Rodolfo Severino, gave a speech in which he emphasized that ASEAN "is not and was not meant to be a supranational entity acting independently of its members. It has no regional parliament or council of ministers with law-making powers, no power of enforcement, no judicial system." 5 He later reaffirmed more bluntly that ASEAN lacks "juridical personality or legal standing under international law." 6 This was consistent with the view that ASEAN was intended to be a kind of social community, rather than a legal community.
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A decade later, ASEAN has a Charter stating that, "ASEAN, as an inter-governmental organisation, is hereby conferred legal personality." 8 On 15 December 2008, that Charter came into effect thirty days after the tenth instrument of ratification had been deposited with the ASEAN Secretary-General. 9 Does this mean that ASEAN before that moment had no international legal personality? And that after the entry into force of the Charter such personality miraculously popped into existence? The answer to both questions is a qualified "no": the lack of such a provision did not mean that ASEAN lacked international legal personality; the presence of one does not mean that it possesses personality in a meaningful sense. This section will briefly outline the basis of a test for international legal personality before applying it to ASEAN. 
A. International Legal Personality
In every legal system, certain entities are regarded as possessing rights and duties enforceable at law. The recognition of those entities as "legal persons" is itself determined by law, a tautology that is reinforced in international law by the centrality of states not merely to the form, but also to the substance of its norms. 10 The practice and consent of states remain axiomatic to the concept of international law, and through the protection of territorial integrity and sovereign immunity, states are its primary beneficiaries.
11 This is replicated in the institutions of international order: only states are recognized as members of the UN; only states may bring contentious claims before the International Court of Justice. 12 (This is distinct from the question of whether an entity's legal personality is recognized in the domestic law of a given state, 13 a point frequently confused in literature 14 and, occasionally, in treaties. 15 ) Nevertheless, international organizations, most prominently the UN itself, and some other entities (the Knights of Malta, for example) have been recognized as having international legal personality. The issue came before the International Court of Justice soon after the creation of the UN when Count Bernadotte, a Swedish national and chief UN truce negotiator in the Middle East, was killed in Jerusalem. The question concerned whether the UN had the capacity to bring an action in its own right against Israel with respect to his death. The Court issued an advisory opinion that the UN did indeed have a measure of legal personality, derived from the consent of the states that established it:
the Organization was intended to exercise and enjoy, and is in fact exercising and enjoying, functions and rights which can only be explained on the basis of the possession of a large measure of international personality and the capacity to operate upon an international plane. It is at present the supreme type of international organization, and it could not carry out the intentions of its founders if it was devoid of international personality. It must be acknowledged that its Members, by entrusting certain functions to it, with the attendant duties and responsibilities, have clothed it with the competence required to enable those functions to be effectively discharged. 16 A complication, however, was that Israel was not yet among those members. 17 The Court went on to hold, nonetheless, that "fifty States, representing the vast majority of the members of the international community, had the power, in conformity with international law, to (2008) bring into being an entity possessing objective international personality, and not merely personality recognized by them alone."
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Six decades later international legal scholars are still arguing about the two theories that can be derived from this advisory opinion.
Will theory
The "will theory" is most widely accepted and corresponds to the first leg of the Court's opinion. If the founders of an international organization intend to endow their creation with personality then that is what it will receive. This theory is supported by the understanding of international law as being based on the freely expressed consent of states.
In the case of the UN legal personality was not explicitly asserted, but today it frequently is. Many international organizations assert international legal personality in their constitutive documents, for example, the International Seabed Authority, 19 Interestingly, some of the major regional organizations are not among this group. Until recently, for example, the EU lacked legal personality. The European Community certainly did have legal personality, but the EU itself was more ambiguous, having limited powers to enter into treaties only. 23 This changed only when the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force on 1 December 2009, adding to the Treaty on European Union a provision that, "The Union shall have legal personality." 24 The Constitutive Act of the African Union does not provide explicitly for its legal personality, possibly on the assumption that it would inherit that of the Organization of African Unity. 25 The Organization of American States does not provide for its own legal personality. 26 As indicated in the Reparations case, however, the failure specifically to outline the intention to create legal personality can be remedied if such an intention can be inferred.
Objective theory
An alternative theory about international legal personality of international organizations goes one step further and suggests that legal personality can be deduced not from the will of the founders, but from the possession of certain attributes by the body itself.
27 This is closer to the manner in which states come into being, with recognition of, say, Kosovo, regarded as being consequent to rather than constitutive of its existence. 28 This makes sense in the context of states coming into being-there is, in fact, a treaty definition of what a state is 29 -but it is less clear when an international organization reaches "organizationhood".
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The International Law Commission has not dealt directly with the question of which international organizations enjoy international legal personality; instead its draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations simply assume that international responsibility only applies to organizations "established by a treaty or other instrument governed by 23 Even if a treaty provision were intended to confer international personality on a particular organization, the acquisition of legal personality would depend on the actual establishment of the organization. It is clear that an organization merely existing on paper cannot be considered a subject of international law. The entity further needs to have acquired a sufficient independence from its members so that it cannot be regarded as acting as an organ common to the members. When such an independent entity comes into being, one could speak of an "objective international personality", as the Court did in its advisory opinion on Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations. The characterization of an organization as a subject of international law thus appears as a question of fact. Although the view has been expressed that an organization's personality exists with regard to non-member States only if they have recognized it, this assumption cannot be regarded as a logical necessity [footnotes omitted].
international law and possessing its own international legal personality". 31 Similarly, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between International Organizations notes in the preamble "that international organizations possess the capacity to conclude treaties, which is necessary for the exercise of their functions and the fulfilment of their purposes". 32 Both reproduce the essentially circular logic from the Reparations case: personality can be deduced from the powers given to an international organization, with the extent of certain powers being deduced in turn from the fact of personality.
A final consideration in this abstract consideration of international legal personality is that it is not plenary-in other words, even if international legal personality is found to exist, that does not conclude the inquiry of what powers such an entity may in fact exercise. In the Reparations case, the ICJ noted that:
the Court has come to the conclusion that the Organization is an international person. That is not the same thing as saying that it is a State, which it certainly is not, or that its legal personality and rights and duties are the same as those of a State. Still less is it the same thing as saying that it is "a super-State", whatever that expression may mean… Whereas a State possesses the totality of international rights and duties recognized by international law, the rights and duties of an entity such as the Organization must depend upon its purposes and functions as specified or implied in its constituent documents and developed in practice.
B. ASEAN's Personality
In the case of ASEAN, the reasoning from the Reparations case is easily extended to ASEAN with respect to the members themselves: ASEAN enjoys such legal personality as those members have endowed it. 34 But the question of whether states and other actors outside ASEAN must recognize it depends on the application of a more objective set of standards. Though there is no consensus in the literature and little authority from courts (primarily focused on the status of the EU and the OSCE), 35 Ian Brownlie has developed a three-part test summarizing the majority views on international legal personality. To enjoy personality, he argues, an organization must possess the following three attributes:
1. a permanent association of states, with lawful objects, equipped with organs; 2. a distinction, in terms or legal powers and purposes, between the organization and its member states; As to the theoretical foundation of such organizations international legal personality, the ILC has observed that the ICJ "appeared to favour the view that when legal personality of an organization exists, it is an "objective" personality. Thus, it would not be necessary to enquire whether the legal personality of an organization has been recognized by an injured State before considering whether the organization may be held internationally responsible according to the present draft articles. On the other hand, an organization merely existing on paper could not be considered as having an "objective" legal personality under international law. 
Permanent association
The first leg is easily satisfied: even before adopting the Charter, ASEAN was certainly a permanent association of states, with lawful objects, equipped with at least rudimentary organs from the outset, growing into a Secretariat over time. 
Distinction between organization and members
Is there, secondly, a distinction, in terms or legal powers and purposes, between the organization and its member states? Traditionally within ASEAN, the answer would have been no. ASEAN's foundational document, the Bangkok Declaration, essentially stated some shared goals and announced an annual meeting of foreign ministers.
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As Tommy Koh and others have argued, the purpose of the Charter is to make ASEAN a more rules-based organization: "The 'ASEAN Way' of relying on networking, consultation, mutual accommodation and consensus will not be done away with. It will be supplemented by a new culture of adherence to rules." 39 This point was emphasized also in the Report of the Eminent Persons Group, which explicitly linked rule-adherence to legal personality. 40 Whether the ASEAN Way, epitomized by musjawarah (consultation) and mufukat (consensus), 41 is compatible with a rules-based organization will be a key challenge to the organization in years to come. 42 In specific areas, however, there has already been some movement.
In the economic sphere, for example, one might argue that ASEAN has a competence distinct from its members. The Framework Agreement for Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation, for example, has provided the basis for agreements on trade liberalization, industrial cooperation, and foreign direct investment. 43 The possibility of majority voting was considered in the 1996 Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism for ASEAN economic agreements. 44 This was never implemented, but was superseded in 2004 by another protocol that went further in providing for a "negative consensus" model under which the 36 Brownlie, supra note 10 at 679-680. Other tests are, of course, possible. 37 ASEAN has developed an extensive network of national actors, but the reference here is to the limited independent organs that exist. It is indicative that ASEAN officials travel on their own national passports. 38 A second area in which there have been interesting developments is on nuclear weapons. This is marginal to the day-to-day operations of ASEAN, but the adoption of the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty in 1995 was unusual for two reasons.
46 This is the treaty that established SEANWFZ (pronounced "see-yan-fez" 47 or "shaun-fizz" 48 ). First, the treaty required only seven ratifications from the ten states parties to enter into force. 49 The treaty would not bind states who had not ratified, but this led to the Philippines sitting in on SEANWFZ meetings as an observer from 1997 until it became a party in June 2001. 50 Secondly, the Commission that was established by the treaty provided for decisions to be made by two-thirds majority in cases where consensus could not be reached. 51 The provision has never been implemented and it is unlikely that any matter will be put to a vote.
Other agreements, such as the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution, have repeated the limited ratification requirement (in that case lowering it to six), 52 but majority voting in other areas was rejected in the discussions on the ASEAN Charter. In so far as ASEAN continues to rely on consensus, where every member effectively has a veto, it begs the question of whether the collectivity genuinely has a separate personality from its members. Outside these two areas of economic cooperation and nuclear weapons, there has been little indication of a willingness to grant any form of independence to the organization qua organization, with active resistance to such a development in the area of human rights.
Powers
Thirdly, does ASEAN possess legal powers exercisable on the international plane and not solely within the national systems of one or more of its states? ASEAN was finally granted observer status at the UN in December 2006, 53 though it was beaten to this milestone by the Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization in 1980, 54 the Asian Development Bank in 2002, 55 and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation in 2004. 56 This means little. A more important test is whether the organization can create and accept legal obligations. The clearest example would be if the organization can enter into treaties in its own right.
The 1979 Agreement Between the Government of Indonesia and ASEAN Relating to the Privileges and Immunities of the ASEAN Secretariat was signed by the Secretary-General of ASEAN, but related only to its status within Indonesia. 57 When outside Indonesia, ASEAN officials travel as nationals of their respective member states. 58 ASEAN has signed various Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) such as the 2000 MOU with Australia on Haze, 59 a 2002 MOU with China on Agricultural Cooperation, 60 and a 2003 MOU with China on Information Communications Technology, 61 but on matters regarded as important or that bind the member states, the various members have signed and ratified in their individual capacities. 62 This appears likely to continue under the Charter. Though the Eminent Persons Group recommended that the Secretary-General be "delegated the authority to sign non-sensitive agreements on behalf of ASEAN Member States", 63 the Charter as adopted merely provides that "ASEAN may conclude agreements with countries" and other entities, with the procedures for concluding such agreements to be prescribed by the ASEAN Coordinating Council in consultation with the Community Councils. 64 So what does this mean in terms of ASEAN's international legal personality? The first thing to note is that personality at the international level is not so much a status as a capacity.
It matters less what you claim than what you do. And, importantly, at the international level there are degrees of legal personality. The UN Charter does not assert personality, but there is no doubt today that the Organization possesses it. The ASEAN Charter asserts personality, but ASEAN would appear to have a very limited form of international legal personality already. From the watered down provisions of the Charter, it is not clear that its ratification will radically alter that analysis of substance as opposed to form.
This was evident in the media release that accompanied the signing of the Charter. Noting that the Charter conferred on ASEAN international legal personality distinct from the member states, the release went on to note that, "Details of what ASEAN can or cannot do with its legal personality will be discussed and stated in a supplementary protocol after the signing of the Charter." 65 Those details will answer the question of whether ASEAN exists in a meaningful sense as an international legal person. By all indications, we will be waiting some time. The question of international legal personality is, in many ways, a theoretical one. As indicated, the contours of that personality remain to be defined. An important factor will be the political environment within which ASEAN operates-in the sense of the willingness of members to cede powers to the centre, and of non-members to deal with that centre. What, then, is the practical significance of ASEAN?
A. Is ASEAN More than the Sum of Its Parts? or Less?
Is ASEAN more than the sum of its parts? When ASEAN was created the answer would probably have been no. The Bangkok Declaration merely laid the basis for a regular meeting with a skeletal institutional structure. Whether it has grown beyond that depends on whom one is asking, with a fairly clear distinction between the views of ASEAN's members and aspiring members, and those with whom it has external dealings.
Among ASEAN members
For its members and those who wish to join it, the significance of ASEAN has changed over time. First, ASEAN has seen the gradual emergence of an identity, justified in large part as a means of linking economies but incidentally establishing regular lines of communication for political, economic and socio-cultural relations. Secondly, its embryonic institutions have grown into more regular contacts and a framework for more formal discussion of multilateral issues.
The Charter formalizes both these trends, more clearly articulating a shared vision for the region and strengthening some of the institutions. On the "vision", it outlines broad if vague support for peace, stability, justice, democracy, and prosperity, with far more concrete purposes articulated in the economic sphere:
To create a single market and production base which is stable, prosperous, highly competitive and economically integrated with effective facilitation for trade and investment in which there is free flow of goods, services and investment; facilitated movement of business persons, professionals, talents and labour; and freer flow of capital.
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On institutions, the Charter makes the ASEAN Summit biannual rather than annual, establishes the meeting of foreign ministers as a Coordinating Council, provides single chairs for high-level ASEAN bodies, calls for the appointment of permanent representatives, and creates three "community councils" in the areas of political and security, economic, and socio-cultural affairs-as well as an undefined "human rights body". 67 At the same time, however, the Charter reaffirms consultation and consensus as a "basic principle". 68 Where consensus cannot be achieved, the ASEAN Summit may decide on how a specific decision can be made. 69 If there is a serious breach of the Charter or non-compliance, the matter will be referred to the ASEAN Summit for decision. 70 formula for economic cooperation. 71 This could strengthen ASEAN by allowing deeper ties between some members, or it could destroy ASEAN by fragmentation.
The second is that ASEAN's Chairman and Secretary-General can be requested to provide good offices, conciliation or mediation in a dispute. 72 A useful comparison may be made with the Secretary-General of the UN. Initially conceived as more "secretary" than "general", the position is described in the UN Charter as the Organization's "chief administrative officer". This has grown over time as various incumbents have expanded the role to become a major diplomatic and political actor in its own right. 73 The third is the discussion about a human rights body. Though it is unlikely that anything comparable to the European Court of Human Rights is likely to be established, the discussion itself has been interesting. As Singapore's Foreign Minister George Yeo observed, there has been disagreement among the members on what form the human rights entity should take, driven in part by fears that Western countries and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) will use it to interfere in domestic politics. The end result of having a "body" was an attempt to placate such concerns, though he gently suggested that though such a body may end up lacking teeth, it "will at least have a tongue and a tongue will have its uses." 74 With the formalization of the position of Secretary-General and the appointment of Surin Pitsuwan, it is possible that a strong Secretary-General could assume responsibility for that tongue.
ASEAN's external relations
So within ASEAN there is some reason for cautious optimism. Outside ASEAN, however, there is an argument that the body is in fact less than the sum of its parts. Tommy Koh has cited two recent examples of policymakers in Washington and Brussels not appearing to take ASEAN particularly seriously:
At the Williamsburg Conference, held in Mongolia in June 2007, I was distressed to hear a senior US official say: "the ASEAN way is no way." At the ASEAN-US Symposium, held in October 2007 in Singapore, I was astonished to hear another senior U.S. official say that he had personally advised Secretary Rice, not once but twice, not to attend the annual ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). I suspect the same attitude prevails in Brussels. This could explain why ministerial meetings between ASEAN and the EU are often attended by full ministers on the ASEAN side, but not on the EU side. 75 To many outside observers ASEAN as an international organization is useful if it binds together the ten members and promotes peace and development, but unless and until it offers something more, then liaising directly with ASEAN does not reduce the need for bilateral diplomacy with the various states. All it does is to add another layer of diplomacy. There are some exceptions to the general rule that ASEAN is not a good interlocutor with external actors, though this tends to be through separate institutions: such as the way in which ASEAN Plus Three has come to be used as a forum to discuss financial coordination and territorial disputes in the South China Sea, or that the ARF is now used as an informal platform for security dialogue between twenty-three states. 77 So in essence, the answer to the question of whether ASEAN matters is probably "yes" to the ten member states, but to everyone else the honest answer would be "not much".
B. To What Should We Compare ASEAN?
Underlying all of this is the question of what ASEAN is meant to be. In particular, is it fair or accurate or helpful to compare it to the UN or the EU? Is that the right test? One might argue, for example, that traditional conceptions of legal personality depend on a notion of sovereignty that is not shared in Asia (or at least Southeast Asia). Instead "nonlegalized" informal institutions are the hallmark of this region, though they can also be seen as exemplars of the new phenomenon of transgovernmental networks that play an increasingly important role in global governance decisions. 78 Even so, there are still useful comparisons to be drawn. But the UN and the EU are the wrong ones. Closer might be the origins of the OAS, or perhaps even more aptly, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which laid the foundations for today's OSCE. ASEAN may well be best understood as a kind of standing diplomatic conference, which is currently talking about becoming something more. Indeed, there is something of an irony that just as ASEAN may become Asia's first truly "legalized" international organization, the CSCE was originally decried as a deplorable departure from legalization with its unenforceable human rights provisions. 79 Despite the scorn of western international relations scholars, however, dissidents were later able to co-opt the language of such documents to call for union rights in Poland, glasnost in Russia, and, after 1989, multi-party elections. 80 These weak norms provided a language for the articulation of rights that later transformed societies. It would be overly optimistic to suggest that the ASEAN Charter will have comparable effects, but changing even the language of international affairs in Southeast Asia is a significant advance on the "Asian values" debates of the 1990s.
Theory also has useful contributions to make, provided we think broadly rather than narrowly. In particular, it may be helpful to understand "institution" not in the narrow sense of legal personality, but in the larger sense of that word used by international relations scholars, denoting "persistent and connected sets of rules (formal or informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations". 81 In that larger sense ASEAN would certainly appear to be an "institution". ASEAN's achievements are not that it is the foundation of an Asian Union to rival the EU, but more modestly that it fosters peace, encourages development, and promotes human rights in a part of the world that needs all three of these things. 82 
III. CONCLUSION
In Molière's Le Bourgeois gentilhomme, M. Jourdain is a foolish member of the middleclass who aspires to join the aristocracy. He orders splendid new clothes and aspires, unsuccessfully, to learning the gentlemanly arts of fencing, dancing, music, and philosophy. His philosophy lesson degenerates into a basic lesson on language and rhetoric in which he seeks to learn prose and is startled to discover that he has been speaking it all his life. 83 To return to the question with which this article opened, and with the assistance of another French author, we might then conclude that ASEAN has always existed and that its problem is not legal personality but a shared vision of the purpose of that existence, of its place in the world. The Charter process, as important as it was, merely deferred most of these questions.
